Artificial Intelligence for Imperfect-Information Games
Papers from the 2018 AAAI Workshop
AAAI Technical Report WS-18-06
This technical report was published as part of The Workshops of the
The Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence by The AAAI Press, Palo Alto, California
794 pp., illus, references.
ISBN 978-1-57735-801-5
Contents
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead / 294
Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm
Dynamic Adaptation and Opponent Exploitation in Computer Poker / 302
Xun Li, Risto Miikkulainen
Consequentialist Conditional Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Imperfect Information (Short Workshop Version) / 310
Alexander Peysakhovich, Adam Lerer
Evaluating the Stability of Non-Adaptive Trading in Continuous Double Auctions: A Reinforcement Learning Approach / 317
Mason Wright, Michael P Wellman
Deep Reinforcement Learning for Green Security Game with Online Information / 325
Lantao Yu, Yi Wu, Rohit Singh, Lucas Joppa, Fei Fang
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