Must Machines be Zombies? Internal Simulation as a Mechanism for Machine Consciousness

Germund Hesslow, Dan-Anders Jirenhed

One of the many problems of consciousness concerns the appearance of an inner world or an inner reality. Having an inner world is a prerequisite for consciousness in a machine. In this paper we will argue that the core of an inner world is already present in a very simple robot. We have previously argued that a crucial mechanism for generating an inner world in humans is the ability of our brains to simulate behaviour and perception. A simple robot has been designed in which perception can be simulated. We argue here that this robot, or one that has been extended in various ways, but without adding any new fundamental principle, has an inner world and subjective experience in the same sense as humans.

Subjects: 4. Cognitive Modeling; 9.4 Philosophical Foundations

Submitted: Oct 12, 2007